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James Gibson

Accidental Rights
Longstanding intellectual property doctrine is inadvertently expanding
intellectual property entitlements and eroding public privileges. And, as my
recent Yale Law Journal article points out, it’s only going to get worse.1
Suppose you’re making a documentary film about the history of satire.
You’d like to use a five-second clip from the television show South Park. Do
you need permission from the owners of the show’s copyright? The answer
depends on the notoriously vague “fair use” doctrine, which means the answer
is unclear. So you get permission and pay for a license, just to be safe. Maybe
you don’t need to, but why risk a lawsuit?
What happens over time, however, is that as more filmmakers in your
position get licenses, the question of whether a license is needed becomes
clearer. Courts essentially say, “Of course a license is needed—just look at all
these filmmakers who are getting one!” The “license, don’t litigate” decisions
combine to expand copyright’s reach and reduce the public’s privileges.
The same thing happens with trademark law. Suppose someone in your
film is drinking a can of Pepsi. Do you need to get a license to include that
brand in the film? The answer (again) is not entirely clear, and so (again) you
would probably decide to get a license, or maybe even strike a product
placement deal. Or perhaps you would “blur out” the mark so consumers will
not recognize it. As consumers encounter more and more trademarks that are
licensed or blurred out, they will come to expect that marks appear only when
the mark owner consents. And when they are wrong—when someone rolls the
dice and includes an unblurred, unlicensed mark—the result will be consumer
confusion over whether the owner consented to the mark’s inclusion. As it
turns out, such confusion is a trigger for trademark liability. As with copyright
law, then, the aggregate effect of all of these licensing decisions is an expansion
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of trademark’s reach and a narrowing of the public’s ability to use marks
without permission.
The most interesting thing about this “doctrinal feedback” phenomenon is
that its expansion of intellectual property rights is inadvertent; it results from
prudent licensing decisions and longstanding legal standards rather than from
new laws or court rulings. The intellectual property user knows that the cost of
going to court to find out whether the law requires a license is higher than the
cost of the license itself. And his or her risk-averse insurers and downstream
distributors know it too. Better safe than sued. So almost no one litigates,
which means there is no opportunity for our formal governance mechanisms to
decide what balance between licensing and the public domain best serves the
public interest. The result is an expansion of rights almost by accident, with no
assurance that the expansion is good for us.
Yet not everyone is so fearful of the courtroom. What happens when an
intellectual property user is not risk-averse, and has no insurers or distributors
whispering in its ear about the wisdom of playing it safe? Such risk-takers are
few and far between, but we can find one prominent example in Google Book
Search,2 a project whose ambitious goal is to make every book in the English
language text-searchable, just as Google’s better-known Internet search engine
has made the World Wide Web searchable. But to realize this goal, Google
must scan the text of every book. And because scanning involves making a
copy, a question arises: does Google need a license—or, rather, millions of
licenses—from the publishers who own the copyrights?
At this point, it should come as no surprise that the answer is unclear and
depends on the famously indeterminate fair use factors. Therefore, if Google
had a “license, don’t litigate” attitude, it would either get licenses or abandon
the project. But Google is no penniless documentarian, beholden to the riskaverse whims of insurers, investors, and distributors. No, Google is an
intellectual property owner’s worst enemy: a risk-taking iconoclast with deep
pockets, seemingly unafraid to litigate licensing issues all the way to the
Supreme Court.3
Perhaps Google Book Search is simply the exception that proves the rule, a
circumstance so rare that it can tell us nothing new about doctrinal feedback. If
the controversy ends up at the Supreme Court, then great: we will have that
exceptional case that results in a formal legal proclamation—that is, an
intentional rather than inadvertent shift in the law.
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If the issue is resolved without an ultimate judgment on the merits,
however, we may see yet another shift in licensing culture that reduces public
privilege. Such a result is hardly far-fetched. Given Google’s determination and
resources, it may be the publishers who experience risk aversion: they may
choose to offer can’t-miss licensing terms to Google rather than face the
prospect of an adverse precedent-setting ruling. Moreover, Google itself may
decide that its interests are best served by making licensing deals—not because
it is afraid of losing in litigation, but because it is one of the few companies
with the resources to pay licensing fees to a wide array of publishers. In other
words, a world in which copyright law requires licenses for this kind of project
may be better for Google, because it means fewer competitors than a world in
which anyone can provide a book search service under the fair use privilege.
And if my argument about doctrinal feedback is correct, then once Google pays
licenses to publishers, any second-comer’s chance of winning a fair use
argument for the same conduct diminishes considerably.
This highlights a worrisome aspect of doctrinal feedback: it may initially
occur inadvertently, but that doesn’t mean it isn’t subject to manipulation once
the players—particularly the rights-holders—realize what’s going on. When
copyright and trademark owners understand that more licensing leads to
broader rights—at least in the long run—they might stop demanding that users
pay exorbitant fees and instead make licensing more feasible and attractive,
even to the penurious documentarian. After all, the doctrinal feedback
phenomenon teaches us that it is usually in a rights-holder’s long-term interest
to agree to license an arguably privileged use, so as to create a market whose
existence can later be cited as proof that the use is not in fact privileged.
This may already have happened in certain industries. Copy shops now
routinely obtain licenses for university “course packs,” perhaps because
publishers used a carrot-and-stick strategy to get a critical mass of shops on
board before suing the holdouts.4 A more recent example involves the question
of whether an Internet search engine that enables users to locate images online
must pay for the right to display search results in the form of low-resolution
thumbnails.5 The first court to consider the issue said no,6 the second court
said yes.7 The difference? The second plaintiff had developed a licensing
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market for low-resolution thumbnails—as background images on cell phone
screens—before filing suit.
Unless we like the idea of defining our rights through mere
happenstance—or worse yet, through purposeful industry manipulation of the
public’s tendency to avoid risk—either Congress or the federal judiciary needs
to recognize and remedy doctrinal feedback. Legislation and court rulings may
have little to do with the feedback loop, but they represent our best hope of
short-circuiting it.
But what exactly is the remedy? Changing the legal standards that fuel the
feedback effect creates more problems than it solves, given how ingrained those
standards are in established law and practice. In the end, I offer a less intrusive
solution: subtle refinements in how the law scrutinizes licensing information
(in copyright) and consumer motivation (in trademark). Copyright law needs
to look to why a licensing market exists, not just whether a licensing market
exists, and it should discount those markets that owe their existence to
uncertainty and risk aversion.8 Trademark law should focus not just on
whether consumers are confused by a mark’s appearance, but whether that
confusion affects their purchasing decisions. If it does not, then there’s no
reason to impose liability—confusion or not.
In any event, simply recognizing that doctrinal feedback exists is an
important first step in deciding where private rights end and public privilege
begins. Licensing regimes do not spring fully formed from the head of the god
Equity, and they do not necessarily involve any conscious policy choice or
reflect an optimal outcome. If the law is to be more than a mere scrivener—if
policy is to be made, not found—then let’s shed some light on this previously
hidden phenomenon.
Jim Gibson is the Director of the Intellectual Property Institute and an Associate
Professor at the University of Richmond School of Law. He is usually averse to
negative feedback, but is willing to take the risk: jgibson@richmond.edu.
Preferred Citation: James Gibson, Accidental Rights, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET
PART 348 (2007), http://yalelawjournal.org/2007/04/25/gibson.html.
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